The subtle headline in the Financial Times in the spring of 2018, ”Germany expresses doubts about sharing intelligence with Austria,” hinted at a significant underlying issue. Austria’s far-right Freedom Party (FPÖ), with its open ties to the Kremlin, had joined the governing coalition, and Herbert Kickl, a prominent FPÖ figure, had been appointed Interior Minister, responsible for the intelligence services. This raised serious concerns in Berlin regarding the security of sensitive information shared with Austria. Just a few years later, the government collapsed following the Ibiza scandal, exposing FPÖ leader Heinz-Christian Strache’s attempt to trade favors with someone he believed to be a Russian oligarch. Subsequent investigations revealed a concerted effort by Moscow to infiltrate and potentially control Austrian security services through the FPÖ.
Despite this history of scandal and compromised national security, Herbert Kickl re-emerged into the political spotlight, not just as a potential cabinet member, but as a possible candidate for Chancellor. The willingness of the Austrian People’s Party (ÖVP), a major conservative party, to consider him for the position highlights a concerning trend: a seeming public forgiveness of the FPÖ’s troubling past. This includes the party’s origins rooted in former SS officers, continued reverence for these figures, and the aforementioned attempts to compromise national security for Russian interests. The FPÖ’s electoral success in the previous year, becoming the largest party, further emboldened their claim to leadership, despite their checkered past.
However, the FPÖ’s 29% of the vote is far from a majority mandate. Their opportunity to form a government arises primarily from the failures of other parties to cooperate and form a stable coalition. The outgoing ÖVP leader, Karl Nehammer, attributed the failure to ”destructive forces” within the Social Democratic Party (SPÖ), which he claimed obstructed necessary compromises on economic policy. This underscores a broader pattern of political dysfunction, not exclusive to Austria, where the political center struggles with self-inflicted wounds, hindering their ability to effectively govern. This inability to compromise, combined with voter dissatisfaction with grand coalitions, creates fertile ground for the rise of extremist parties.
The situation in Austria serves as a cautionary tale for other European nations. The Wall Street Journal’s European correspondent, Goran Panjevski, suggests that where Austria is today, Germany and France may be headed tomorrow – unable to form effective and stable governments without including the far right. This observation resonates with the political gridlock seen in both countries. France, despite a potential majority among Macron’s liberals, the remnants of the center-right, and the traditional center-left, is plagued by recurring government crises. Germany has also experienced instability, with the collapse of Olaf Scholz’s coalition due to the FDP’s refusal to increase spending, even for Ukraine aid. These examples highlight the difficulties faced by traditional political parties in finding common ground and governing effectively.
At the heart of this dysfunction lies a fundamental breakdown in the ability of political parties to compromise within parliamentary systems designed for collaboration. Despite often minor policy differences, particularly on economic issues, and shared perspectives on major challenges like the Russian threat, the EU’s importance, and the climate crisis, petty squabbles and an escalating tone dominate political discourse. The focus on obstructing each other, rather than finding common ground, leads to either complete failure to cooperate or the formation of unstable and ineffective governments. This political paralysis creates a dangerous vacuum that extremist parties, like the FPÖ, are readily positioned to exploit.
The willingness to hand over the reins of power, not just a ministry but potentially the chancellorship, to a pro-Moscow far-right party demonstrates the extent of this dysfunction. This pattern extends beyond Austria, with examples like turning a blind eye to Putinist disinformation campaigns influencing democratic processes in other countries, including Sweden. Even when there is broad agreement on major goals, such as rebuilding state capacity and core functions, the possibility of meaningful cooperation between traditional rivals is dismissed as an impossibility. This inability to bridge divides, even when expert consensus points towards combined approaches as the most effective solutions, reflects the damaging impact of these ”destructive forces.” This self-sabotaging behavior within the political establishment may well be a contributing factor to public disillusionment and the rise of populist and extremist alternatives.
