On a Saturday afternoon in August, a Volvo crashed into a pole on a city street in Nacka, east of Stockholm. The car’s fender was damaged and the pole toppled onto the asphalt. A man in his 60s exited the vehicle and sat by the roadside. Police arrived and conducted a breathalyzer test. The man admitted to having consumed ”a few beers” before driving, claiming he didn’t believe it would be detectable. While no one was injured, the car sustained damage. One officer described the man as ”very indifferent.” The man revealed he had terminal cancer with only about a year left to live. The breathalyzer test indicated a blood alcohol content of over 1.2 per mille, but the man insisted he hadn’t felt intoxicated, merely shocked by the accident.
In late October, the Nacka District Court found the man guilty of aggravated drunk driving. The court cited a penalty equivalent to one month in prison, noting that special circumstances would be required to deviate from this sentence. The man’s health became central to the case. The court acknowledged his ”serious cancer,” his full-time sick leave, and his palliative care. Imprisonment was deemed unduly harsh due to his condition, and community service was deemed unsuitable. Consequently, the court issued a suspended sentence combined with a substantial fine totaling 180,000 kronor.
The man appealed the verdict, submitting a medical certificate to the Svea Court of Appeal. The higher court then adjusted the sentence. Declaring it ”obviously unreasonable to impose a penalty for the act,” the court granted a waiver of penalty. The man was entirely spared punishment. This action, known as a ”waiver of penalty” (påföljdseftergift), is a rare legal measure. It allows a court to entirely dismiss the penalty, even while acknowledging the individual’s guilt. This can be applied in cases of severe injury resulting from the crime, advanced age, or, as in this instance, extremely poor health. The intent is to avoid excessively harsh consequences.
Hovrättsråd Martin Andersson, of the Göta Court of Appeal, emphasized the exceptional nature of granting a waiver of penalty. He described it as a measure used sparingly, meant for situations where other options are unavailable to prevent demonstrably unjust outcomes. While he refrained from commenting directly on the Nacka case, Andersson stressed that compelling reasons are necessary for a court to invoke a penalty waiver. He highlighted the increased justification for waiving imprisonment in cases of severe illness. Having never personally applied this measure under such circumstances, Andersson underscored its rarity.
Andersson further clarified the applicability of penalty waivers. While cautioning against minimizing the seriousness of drunk driving, he noted that the measure is generally more appropriate for less severe crimes. He explained that the threshold for granting a waiver rises with the severity of the crime, making it unlikely to be applied in cases of serious offences. The rationale behind this tiered approach is to reserve this exceptional measure for situations where the imposition of a penalty would create a disproportionately harsh outcome relative to the nature of the crime and the circumstances of the offender.
The case illustrates the complexities of legal decision-making, where balancing the principles of justice with individual circumstances often requires navigating a difficult terrain. While the act of drunk driving is undeniably dangerous and warrants appropriate sanctions, the legal system also acknowledges the need for flexibility and compassion when confronting extenuating circumstances, such as terminal illness. The waiver of penalty, though rare, serves as a crucial safety valve within the legal system, enabling courts to prevent undeniably unjust punishments when no other avenues are available. The man in Nacka, facing the end of his life, avoided further burden from the legal system due to this unusual provision, highlighting the system’s capacity for both accountability and empathy.
