The shift in Russian intelligence operations stems from the repercussions of the large-scale attack on Ukraine in February 2022. Western nations responded swiftly by expelling Russian embassy personnel suspected of being intelligence officers under diplomatic cover. This expulsion, estimated by Estonian security services to include around 700 individuals across Europe and other countries, has significantly hampered Russia’s traditional espionage tactics. Forced to adapt, Russian intelligence agencies have resorted to new methods, as acknowledged by Thomas Nilsson, head of Swedish Military Intelligence and Security (MUST). The conventional approach of cultivating agents through direct contact and meetings has become significantly more challenging.
One prominent adaptation observed by MUST, and echoing warnings from other intelligence agencies like Säpo and MI6, is the increased reliance on inresande underrättelseofficerare – intelligence officers entering a target country for short periods. This method makes surveillance more difficult compared to monitoring embassy-based operatives. Once inside the Schengen Area, these officers gain greater mobility, making them harder to track and identify. This tactic necessitates heightened vigilance and more sophisticated counterintelligence efforts. Nilsson emphasizes that while Sweden hasn’t been a primary focus of these activities, it remains a clear target within the broader context of Russian operations against Western support for Ukraine.
Beyond the shift in human intelligence tactics, Nilsson highlights several other concerning developments. Sabotage, including arson and planned assassinations, is a significant concern. While not yet observed in Sweden at a large scale, it represents a tangible threat given the country’s stance towards the conflict in Ukraine. This aligns with observations from British intelligence agencies, which have flagged an increasing risk of Russian sabotage targeting Western infrastructure and interests. Nilsson underscores that Sweden, as a supporter of Ukraine, must remain vigilant against such threats.
Another area of concern is the escalated use of technical intelligence gathering. This includes signal intelligence, cyberattacks, and the deployment of state-sponsored hackers against critical infrastructure to cause disruption or steal information. The limitations imposed on traditional human intelligence activities have seemingly driven a greater emphasis on these technological methods. As person-based intelligence gathering becomes more challenging, Russia is compensating by strengthening its cyber capabilities and offensive digital operations, posing a significant threat to national security and the integrity of critical systems.
The case of the Dultsev family, Russian illegalists apprehended in Slovenia, highlights another evolving facet of Russian espionage. These deep-cover agents spend years building false identities and integrating into target societies. Similar cases have emerged in Norway and other countries, demonstrating the long-term commitment Russia invests in these operations. Such agents can gather valuable intelligence over extended periods, making their detection and neutralization exceedingly difficult. The Dultsev case serves as a stark reminder of the persistent and multifaceted nature of Russian intelligence activities.
While the immediate threat of large-scale military action against Sweden remains low due to Russia’s current focus on Ukraine, Nilsson anticipates a change in posture once the war concludes. The Russian armed forces are gaining valuable experience in modern warfare, both with and against advanced weaponry. This learning process is not exclusive to Ukraine and the West; Russia is also adapting and refining its tactics. MUST monitors these developments closely, particularly the build-up of Russian bases and troops along the borders with NATO countries in the north. Finland, for instance, anticipates a significant increase in Russian troops stationed near its borders, highlighting the ongoing military implications of the conflict in Ukraine and the broader geopolitical tensions. Although Russia’s current rhetoric exceeds its current capabilities in the Nordic region, the potential for future action cannot be ignored. Once Russia recovers from its current military engagement, it is expected to adopt a more assertive and potentially aggressive stance, leveraging the lessons learned in Ukraine to reshape its military doctrine and operational capabilities. This underscores the need for continued vigilance and preparedness by Sweden and its allies.
