Escalating Hybrid Warfare: Russia’s Asymmetrical Tactics Against NATO
In November 2023, Richard Moore, the head of the British intelligence agency MI6, accused Russia of an "astonishingly reckless" wave of sabotage across Europe. This accusation coincided with Germany blaming Russia for sabotaging two undersea cables in the Baltic Sea. These incidents highlight a growing concern among Western security experts: the increasing likelihood of hybrid attacks against NATO countries.
Hybrid warfare, a blend of military and civilian tactics, represents a significant threat. It encompasses a wide range of actions, from cyberattacks and intrusions into water reservoirs to arson, assassination attempts, and the deployment of unidentified drones over critical infrastructure like nuclear power plants and oil and gas installations. This form of warfare offers several advantages to Russia, primarily allowing them to operate below the threshold that would trigger NATO’s Article 5 collective defense clause. Russia’s economy, comparable in size to Texas, limits its ability to engage in a conventional war against NATO. Therefore, operating in the gray zone below the threshold of armed conflict allows Russia to exploit vulnerabilities within Western civilian societies while avoiding direct military confrontation with a superior force.
Professor Tormod Heier, an expert in military strategy and operations at the Norwegian Defence College, believes that Russia’s internal vulnerabilities drive this increasingly aggressive posture. As the situation within Russia becomes more precarious, and the leadership more susceptible to pressure, a sense of paranoia grows, fueling fears of potential Western intervention. This leads to a strategy of projecting an image of strength and danger, even as Russia’s conventional military capabilities are arguably at their weakest since the end of World War II, heavily depleted by the ongoing conflict in Ukraine. Hybrid warfare serves as a means to compensate for this weakness, creating instability and fear while minimizing the risk of a full-scale military response.
NATO’s structure, primarily designed for conventional warfare, faces challenges in responding effectively to these hybrid threats. These attacks often fall under the jurisdiction of civilian law enforcement agencies, which lack the resources and intelligence capabilities to attribute them definitively to a state actor. Connecting seemingly isolated incidents to a coordinated campaign of state-sponsored hybrid warfare requires sophisticated intelligence gathering and analysis, something that national police forces are often ill-equipped to handle. The burden of proof becomes a significant hurdle, hindering the ability to hold Russia accountable and deter further attacks.
One potential solution, according to Heier, lies in increased intelligence sharing between NATO and civilian law enforcement, along with enhanced support for civilian crisis management. Strengthening defenses around critical infrastructure, particularly underwater and aerial surveillance, could also make it more difficult for Russia to carry out sabotage operations. This requires a shift in focus and resource allocation, recognizing that the most likely threat vector isn’t necessarily a full-scale military invasion, but a persistent campaign of disruption and destabilization targeting civilian infrastructure and societal resilience.
Heier predicts a Russian focus on economic warfare, targeting critical infrastructure like gas pipelines and fiber optic cables. These cables represent the nervous system of the Baltic Sea region, essential for the economic productivity of Sweden, Finland, Norway, and the Baltic states. Disrupting these networks would have cascading effects, impacting everything from the supply of essential goods like food and medicine to the operation of businesses and critical services. The economic chaos resulting from such attacks could cripple national economies and sow widespread social unrest.
Beyond fiber optic cables, potential targets include renewable energy infrastructure, oil refineries, cell towers, water reservoirs, water purification plants, and air and maritime traffic control systems. Major ports, crucial for the import of essential goods, are particularly vulnerable. Disrupting these logistical hubs could have devastating consequences for national supply chains, leading to shortages of essential goods and widespread economic disruption. Heier argues that many NATO countries, including Sweden, Norway, and Finland, are preparing for the wrong kind of war, focusing on the unlikely scenario of a nuclear conflict while neglecting the far more probable threat of persistent hybrid warfare. This misallocation of resources leaves civilian infrastructure and essential services vulnerable to attack. Heier emphasizes the need for increased investment in civilian law enforcement and crisis management capabilities, recognizing the crucial role these agencies will play in countering hybrid threats. A seamless national total defense strategy, integrating both military and civilian resources, is essential to effectively counter the multifaceted nature of hybrid warfare. This necessitates a fundamental shift in strategic thinking, moving beyond traditional military doctrines and embracing a more comprehensive approach to national security that recognizes the interconnectedness of civilian and military domains.
