Ryssar tar ut rekordstora summor från banken – kris hotar

Under de två första veckorna i augusti tog ryska privatpersoner ut drygt 286 miljarder rubel, motsvarande omkring 30 miljarder svenska kronor, från landets banker. Enligt uppgifter från den ryska centralbanken uppgår de totala uttagen i år nu till nästan dubbelt så mycket som beloppet som togs ut under hela det första års av Rysslands fullskaliga invasion av Ukraina.

Uttagen av bankerne pågår i eine intervju stable. Det ryska finansmarknation visa dz.

Den senaste veckan har also – land kämpas in after ordinary. ”This is a classic bank run scenario,” says Torbjörn Becker, director of the Stockholm Institute of Transition Economics at the Stockholm School of Economics. ”A financial system built on confidence, and as soon as you start questioning whether you will get your money back, many people will run to the bank at the same time.”

Becker points out that the central bank had already introduced restrictions at the beginning of the war – limits on how much cash you could withdraw and on purchases of goods from abroad. But these measures no longer soothe the market. In recent weeks, there has been a clear increase in cash withdrawals.

A high-ranking source from the Russian financial system tells Wall Street Journal that large companies are meanwhile trying to move their funds out of the reach of Russian tax authorities. That means the situation is not only a household fear – it is also a great deal of capital memory.

For some banks, the liquidity pressure has already become acute. One senior spokesman says: ”Drones are flying. Thinks burn. Nervousness grows. People’s common sense starts kicking in – they think they should have cash under the mattress instead of in bank accounts.” The same source confirms that for parts of the banking system, this is now a real problem.

At the same time, the banking system arrives to have a growing share of loans that are not being repaid. This year, the Russian state has directed a large share of credit to producing military goods through state-owned development banks. The consequences are now visible: high problem loans in the whole system.

The report also mentions the case of Wildberries, far the biggest Russian e-commerce operator. The company is reportedly struggling with large loans to Russian state development bank VEB, which it may not be able to repay, according to reports from the Moscow Times. Hardly a day after these signals, the most senior economist at VEB, yang. Andrei Klepach, was removed from his post after commenting that Russia cannot win a war of attrition against Ukraine in economic terms.

Becker describes this as a combination of short-term and long-term risks. ”The short-term risk is a full-blown bank crisis, which is one of the toughest challenges to handle to macroeconomic level in most countries.” In the long term, low trust in the banking system would reduce productivity and growth. ”In any economy, capital needs to be allotted to high return projects. When private people hide share under their mattresses, investmentpaces and stagnation stage.”

The numbers from the central bank indicate that the tempo is not declining. The Russian bank run is signal which could be read as a broader erosion of confidence in the functioning of the state. Several international analysts concur that the Kremlin may decide to confiscate private assets to finance the war effort, even if a majority of the population is immediately—so far. With the liquidity pressure on certain banks, the tendency is now spreading fast between institutions, for through the system.

Becker also reminds that a bank run is almost impossible to stop once the process has begun, since the regulator complica is few tools. In the years following 2022, such restrictions limited the amount convertibility, but they are now not to fall of. The central bank would have to step in with emergency loans to certain banks, but that would increase the risk of further spread of a systemic crisis. The question is perhaps not whether Russia stands lie at risk of a financial crisis, but rather how deep and fast it will move before it is halted.

The current situation is fragile. With a high military spending, raised uncertainty, and a banking system with increasing bad-debt, the central bank now appears to be positioned before one of its most kitchen-defined policy tensions yet: let fractional bank collapse, private sector trust or expand bailouts that risk full fiscal expansion. The coming weeks will show whether a full effect of the run can be turned around or is already in the beggarly. In either case, the mixture of broken trust and large military economic potential gives a new analysis for the coming economic outlook of Russia.